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The purpose of this Communication is to show that a peaceful and successful transition 
to  a  market  economy  and  political  pluralism  in  Cuba  requires  the  forging  of new 
international and  regional bonds,  and  that,  by virtue of its very  size,  the EU is  well 
placed to play a leading part in that process. 
With  the collapse of COMECON in  1989  Cuba was cast adrift from  its international 
moorings,  creating  a climate of change that has  already  seen  a number of economic 
reforms adopted, with others in the pipeline. 
Opening up  all aspects of Cuban life to  the outside world  will have a far-reaching,  if 
gradual, impact in terms of social change. EU policy, here as elsewhere, must be based 
on the firm conviction that human rights are better understood and  better protected in 
societies in  which goods,  investment,  individuals and  ideas circulate freely.  Provided 
Cuba continues  its policy of opening  up  to  the  world,  the EU  should  do  its  best to 
encourage this trend,  by fostering  dialogue and promoting Cuba's active participation 
in the activities of the international community in all political and economic fields. 
This paper covers the economic and political situation in  Cuba,  relations between the 
European Union and Cuba and incorporates a Commission proposal for the creation of 
an EU/Cuba dialogue. 
I.  ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN CUBA 
A. ECONOMIC SITUATION 
a) Developments since 1989 and reforms introduced to date 
With  the  collapse  of COMECON  in  1989  Cuba  wa~ cast  adrift  from  its 
international moorings, losing at one stroke not only its main supplier but also 
its  principal  customer.  A  terrible  crisis  ensued,  and  by  1993,  Cuba  was 
importing and exporting nearly four times less than in 1989. 
However,  the  Castro  regime  has  confounded  widespread  expectations  by 
surviving the disappearance of its communist bloc allies. 
This can be ascribed to: 
- the fear shared by a large part of the Cuban people of a return to "hardline" 
capitalism via an uncontrolled economic transition dictated by Miami-based 
capital and leading to a loss of sovereignty and even identity; 
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- the emergence of a  group of reformers  who appear  to  be extenomg  and 
consolidating their position; 
- the adoption, at this group's behest, of a series of  economic reforms which, 
although  inadequate  and  iftcomplete,  at  least  go  some  way  towards 
rationalization, the liberalization of  economic ties with the rest of the world 
and the beginnings of a private enterprise culture. Some of these measures, 
such  as  the liberalization  of agricultural  markets  and  the  possession  of 
foreign currency, seem  to be have been  adopted to provide a  springboard 
for future reforms (the main reforms adopted are listed in annex A). 
This process has  already  yielded  tangible  results.  For example,  the  Cuban 
peso,  which stood at 130 to one US dollar on the black market in July 1994, 
has now  recovered  to  30 to  the dollar.  The latest figures  show  the  Cuban 
economy performing slightly better. 
That said, the crisis unleashed in 1989 has had a profound impact on the social 
security and education systems that Cuba had built up, although the authorities 
give the utmost priority to maintaining the highest possible standards of public 
health and education. 
b) Sclleduled economic refonns 
·A number of major reforms are planned for this summer: 
- Reform of the law on foreign investment 
The  revised  legislation  will  simplify  the  administrative  formalities 
governing  foreign  investment,  allowing  foreign  investors  to .take  100% 
control of  businesses in most sectors and liberalizing working conditions. 
- Extension of the law on small-scale private enterprise. 
A  law passed  in July  1993 authorized  Cubans  to  set  up  "for  their own 
account• in around 100 independent professions. The scheduled amendment 
will extend the law to other professions, but more importantly will allow 
graduates, hitherto ineligible, to benefit from the arrangement. 
~  Launch of  a major business restructuring programme 
This  programme  will  involve  privatizing  companies  that  can  attract  a 
majority  foreign  capital  stake,  making  most of them  •autonomous"  and 
closing down  those that cannot be made profitable.  Top Cuban  officials 
have  announced  that  this  operation  will  entail  redundancy  for  500 000 
workers,  who  will have to find  new employment chiefly  by  developing 
private initiatives. 
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the Cuban people, and may well provoke a degree of social unrest. 
B. THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION 
The Cuban  government remains  unbound  by democratic  constraints  whether 
institutional,  constitutional,  or  related  to  the  fundamental  freedoms  (of 
association, speech, expression and opinion). 
Several  reports  by  the  Member  States'  Ambassadors  address  the  issue  of 
Cuba's political detainees.  At the moment there are several hundred of them; 
they receive the same treatment as  normal prisoners, and although there have 
been complaints about psychological pressure and biased and over-expeditious 
trials, cases of physical ill-treatment are extremely rare. 
Aside  from  the  issue  of political  prisoners,  Cuba has  not  ratified  the  main 
international conventions on human  rights and the Castro regime continues to 
exercise considerable control over the Cuban people, although there are signs 
that  it is  already  waning  as  a  result  of the economic  reforms.  Government 
repression is primarily focused  on preventing the emergence of an  organized 
opposition. 
During his recent visit to France (15 March), Fidel Castro agreed to allow the 
NGO  France-Libertes  to  conduct  a  mission  to  assess  the  plight  of Cuba's 
political prisoners. Senior  representatives of France-Libertes, the International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Medecins du Monde and Human Rights 
Watch/  Americas  duly  visited  Cuba  from  28 April  to  5 May,  during  which 
time the team was able to meet 24 political prisoners of its own choosing. 
The team was aggrieved to discover that political prisoners were mixed in with 
criminal offenders,  and  noted  that their sentences were very  harsh and  trials 
often over-expeditious. On the other hand,  none of the prisoners they met had 
been physically ill-treated when  being examined,  although  they  did  complain 
of  psychological pressure tactics, including solitary confinement. 
The  team  discussed  these  issues  at  some  length  with  Fidel  Castro,  and 
proposed continuing its work in Cuba in collaboration with the authorities. 
Following the mission,  a number of political prisoners were freed,  including 
Sebastian Arcos,  founder of the Comite pro Derechos Hunianos de Cuba.  In 
view of Mr Arcos'  symbolic status,  his  unconditional release was  interpreted 
as indicating that a degree of domestic opposition would be tolerated. 
Another interesting development is the emergence of large numbers of NGOs 
over the past few years in Cuba. 
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While many of  them are clearly extensions of tile administration, and as such 
do not really qualify as NGOs in the European sense, others have nevertheless 
created themselves real room to manoeuvre; these are the first, hesitant signs 
of a civil society finding its voice. 
More recently,  Mr Gutierrez  Menoyo,  the  leader of the  opposition  group 
Cambio Cubano who now lives in exile in Miami after spending 22 years in a 
Cuban  jail,  visited  Havana  to  take  part  in  a  seminar  on  "participatory 
democracy"  with  representatives  of the  Cuban  government.  After  meeting 
President Castro, Mr Gutierrez Menoyo said that by holding this seminar in 
Cuba the regime had made a gesture of  political openness. 
IT.  RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUBA 
a) Introduction 
Cuba is now the only Latin  American country with  which  the European Union 
has not concluded a cooperation agreement.  However,  there are no barriers to 
trade between  the  two  parties,  and  Cuba benefits  from  the  Community  GSP 
scheme.  Diplomatic relations are normal:  11  Member States have Embassies in 
Cuba,  where  the  Commission  is  represented  by  the  head  of  the  Mexico 
Delegation. 
b) The Council 
The Council has debated the Cuba question a number of times over the past three 
years, often in response to reports received from Member States'  Ambassadors. 
The position  that  has  emerged  from  these debates  is that  relations  with  Cuba 
should reflect the transition process. 
c)  The Eurqpean Parliament 
Parliament has recorded its position on Cuba in two Resolutions. 
The Resolution of 15  September 1993 condemned the Torricelli law,  a piece of 
extraterritorial US  legislation approved in  1992 with the aim of reinforcing  the 
embargo, and stressed its concern to see greater respect for human rights on the 
island, calling on the European Union and Cuba to step up political,  economic 
and cultural dialogue with a view to concluding a cooperation agreement as soon 
as  possible.  Parliament  also  called  on  the  Commission  to  take  immediate 
measures to encourage the liberalization of the Cuban economy. 
The Resolution of 29 September 1994, which was adopted against the backdrop 
of the boat people crisis,  stressed the need for change in  Cuba,  welcomed  the 
first contacts between the government and Cuban exiles, and called on the United 
States to lift its embargo to prevent social upheaval on the island. 
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cooperation programmes and  to  start talks  with  the Cuban government without 
delay with a view to concluding a framework cooperation agreement. 
From these two Resolutions it is clear that the European Parliament believes that 
a successful,  peaceful transition to a  market economy and political pluralism in 
Cuba will require the active  support of the European  Union  to  help  bind  the 
island republic back into the international community. 
d) The Member States 
Most  Member  States  maintain  strong  bilateral  economic  ties  with  Cuba  and 
actively encourage their companies to establish themselves in the Cuban market 
through measures such as business delegations,  agreements on the protection of 
investment and export credits. 
A considerable proportion of the 200 or so joint ventures set up in Cuba over the 
past few years have been created at the initiative of European companies. 
Annex C lists the main international agreements concluded between Cuba and the 
Member States and details recent political or economically inspired visits to  the 
island by representatives of the Member States and some private bodies. 
e)  Community action; humanitarian aid and ad hoc support for the reforms 
Before  1993  there  was  virtually  no  cooperation  with  Cuba,  the  sole exception 
being  an  indirect  contribution  of food  aid  via  the  World  Food  Programme. 
Starting in  1993,  in  response to  positions adopted by the Member States in  the 
context of Political Cooperation and the Parliament Resolutions cited above,  the 
Commission introduced a  humanitarian aid programme plus a  series of ad  hoc 
measures tailored  to  Cuba's specific needs  and aimed  at supporting  the reform 
process. 
Humanitarian  aid  activities  are  carried  out  by  the  European  Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), with the aim of helping the most vulnerable of the 
Cuban people (women, children, the sick and the elderly). This aid is channelled 
through  European  NGOs  who  carry  out projects  approved  by  the  Commission 
from  start to  finish.  The  European  Parliament  has  on  a  number  of occasions 
endorsed these aid activities, the effectiveness of which was recently emphasized 
by  the Member  States'  Ambassadors  in  Havana  when  the  Commissioner  for 
Humanitarian Aid visited Cuba. 
In 1993 ECU 5 million was allocated to humanitarian aid to Cuba, a figure which 
rose to ECU 14  million in  1994.  Expert opinion,  including that of the Member 
States'  Ambassadors  to  Cuba,  is  unanimous  in calling  for  the  continuation  of 
these aid activities in  view of the social and economic conditions on the island. 
The amount allocated to humanitarian aid in 1995 should be the same as in 1994. 
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through European  NGOs~ whose presence on  the ground serves as  an  example 
that encourages the tentative Cuban grassroots. ECU 2.5 million was allocated to 
these NGO projects in 1994,  a level of financing that should be maintained  this 
year. 
There  have  also  been  isolated  economic  cooperation  projects  to  support  the 
reforms~ for example the programme to train business managers in the ways of a 
market economy that starts this October, which will give 120 Cubans a Master's 
degree in  the disciplines  concerned.  Another  example is  the  weekly  television 
show &pacio Europa, comprising a European film and a summary of the week's 
European news.  The funds allocated to this type of cooperation have progressed 
from ECU 0.5 million in 1994 to around ECU 5 million this year.  Furthermore, 
Parliament. has created two special budget headings (for Cuban SMEs and  Cuban 
NGOs).  A pilot structural food  aid  programme supporting  the  relaunch  certain 
sectors of agriculture may be implemented in the next few months. 
m.  CUBA •s RELt\TIONS WITH ITS NEIGUBOVRS 
a)  The United States 
Relations  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba  are  progressing  slowly,  but 
continue to generate controversy in the US.  One school of thought maintains that 
economic emigration can be slowed and the pace of economic reform stepped up 
by adopting a constructive approach. In the other camp, the draft "Cuban Liberty 
and Democracy Solidarity Act of 1995"  (also known as the "Helms-Burton" bill) 
advocates a policy of confrontation  and  isolation.  The EU  has  clearly stated its 
fundamental objection to this bill. 
The US  embargo is not smoothing  Cuba's path  towards a  market economy and 
political  pluralism.  Normal  trade  with  the  USA  would  bring  increased  daily 
contact and would undoubtedly encourage the transition process. 
The embargo is instead blocking the Cuban reform process, a state of affairs that 
the Helms-Burton bill would only aggravate.  The bill is still being assessed,  but 
if it were to be adopted, it would have the following repercussions: 
- unilateral  internationalization  of  the  embargo  (through  extra-territorial 
provisions designed to discourage companies from third countries from trading 
with Cuba); 
- Intensification  of the dispute between  Cuba and  the  US  with  regard  to  the 
expropriation  of the  property  of US  nationals  and  Cuban  exiles  that  have 
acquired US citizenship. 
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had  to  be submitted following  a  given procedure before  1972.  Some 5  911 
such  claims  have  been  endorsed,  with  38  companies  accounting  for around 
86%  of the total amount claimed from  Cuba.  It is the fact that the process is 
closed  and  the  number  of claimants  fairly  limited  that  renders  negotiations 
between  the  two  States  possible,  and  it  is  worth  noting  that  Cuba  has · 
concluded  compensation  agreements  with  other  countries  whose  nationals 
sustained losses. 
Numerous indicators  suggest that  the  reformers will  be unable  to  achieve  a 
decisive  qualitative  and  quantitative  breakthrough  unless  Cuba is  offered  a 
chance  to  re-define  its  international  relations  in  terms  of the  new  world 
situation. 
The current US  administration  is  openly  opposed  to  the Helms-Burton  bill, 
favouring  a  more  subtle  policy  suggested  by  the  recent  agreement  on 
migration,  President  Clinton's appointment of a  special  envoy,  and  Warren 
Christopher's statements to Congress in which he discerned the first,  tentative 
moves towards a market economy in Cuba. 
Moreover, the US press (note the New York Times,  17 May 1995) referred to 
a  recent internal  Pentagon  report  on  Cuba,  a  300-page paper  entitled  "The 
Military  and  Transition  in  Cuba:  Reference  Guide  for  Policy  and  Crisis 
Management". 
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transitional phase in  which Fidel Castro is a  key  player,  and  that American 
strategic interests call for support for the economic and political reforms now 
under  way  rather  than  punitive  sanctions.  This  analysis  would  seem  to  be 
endorsed by the National Security Council. 
US  public  opinion  is  also  increasingly  agreed  on  the  need  for  a  posttlve 
approach to the Cuban question.  Over the last two years,  a total of USD  65 
million  has  been  channelled  into  Cuba  through  the  activities  of  NGOs, 
churches and other charities. 
b) Mexico 
Cuba enjoys privileged relations with Mexico. There are frequent official visits in 
both  directions,  and  Fidel  Castro  was  present  at  the  investiture  of President 
Emesto  Zedillo.  Mexico has  a  strong  economic presence  in  Cuba;  by  way  of 
example,  a  major  Mexican  industrial  group  recently  took  a  50%  stake  in 
Telef6nica  Cubana.  Numerous  bilateral  agreements  link  the  two  countries, 
including agreements on oil supplies. 
see The New York Times of  17 May 1995. 
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Canada  has  been  stepping  up  its  relations  with  Cuba.  Ricardo  Alarc6n,  the 
President of the Cuban  National  Assembly,  and  Roberto  Robaina,  the Foreign 
Minister, recently went on an official trip to Canada,  which  was reciprocated by 
the Canadian junior foreign affairs minister's visit to Cuba. 
Canada has just reinstated development cooperation  with  Cuba and  is currently 
assessing  the  first NGO  projects.  Canadian  companies  are  well  represented  in 
Cuba, and the two countries have just initialled an agreement on  the protection 
and promotion of investment. 
d) CARICOM 
In April  1993,  despite pressure brought to bear by certain  sectors of American 
political opinion, a Cuba/Caricom Joint Committee was set up to debate issues of 
mutual interest and seek common solutions. 
Caricom also strongly supported Cuba's application to become a full  member of 
the Association of Caribbean States. 
The Joint Committee has  suggested that Cuba might participate as  a provider of 
technical  assistance  in  certain  regional  cooperation  projects  in  the  Caribbean 
funded  by  international  donors  such  as  the  IDB,  the  World  Bank  and  the 
European Community. 
IV.  CUBA'S RELATIONS WlTH THE EU; THE WAY FORWARD 
By virtue of its very size the EU is probably the best placed of Cuba's partners to 
initiate measures to accompany the reforms. If we prepare the ground thoroughly 
with our Cuban partners and their neighbours, the EU could launch a programme 
that would  succeed in  drawing in  other major partners such as  Canada,  Mexico, 
the Rio Group and Caricom. 
An  initiative along  these  lines  would  thus  have  the  effect  of binding  a  newly 
pluralist Cuba firmly into the international community, which is essential if there 
is to be a decisive breakthrough in the internal transition process. 
The first step would be to initiate a dialogue, a series of consultations with Cuban 
representatives  aimed  at  establishing  an  appropriate  framework  and  level  for 
EU/Cuba  relations,  taking  account  of  developments  on  the  economic  and 
institutional reform front. 
A dialogue of this kind would provide a forum for a thorough exchange of views 
on the reforms, the development of a civil society, and measures to safeguard and 
extend private initiative and personal freedom. 
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Another subject to  be debated  is  the future  development of EU/Cuba relations 
and the type of framework that would be appropriate. 
This would enable the parties jointly to examine the nature of the accompanying 
measures from which  Cuba would wish to benefit in pursuit of its liberalization 
and reform process. 
If the Council  of Ministers endorses  this  approach,  the Commission  will  start 
exploratory talks to identify the kind of framework that should be given to future 
EU/Cuba relations. 
10 Annex A 
mE  MAIN BEFOBMS 
The  main  economic  reforms  adopted  by  Cuba  were  described  as  follows  in  an 
Economist Intelligence Unit publication of December 1994 entitled Cuba: prospects for 
reform, trade and investment (p.19): 
Chron!!logy of economic chanee 
February 1982:  The Council  of State 
approves Legislative Decree No. 50 on 
Economic Associations  between  Cuban 
and  Foreign  Entities.  This  authorises 
foreign  investment  through  joint 
ventures,  but  very  little  interest  is 
generated. 
April1987:  The  tourism  corporation 
Cubanacan  is  established  independently 
from  the  National  Tourism  Institute 
with a brief to fmd foreign partners for 
hotel projects. 
December  1989:  The  Berlin  Wall 
comes down. Within a year the trading 
system  Cuba  built  up  with  the  Soviet 
bloc over 30 years is in ruins. 
May 1990: The first joint-venture hotel 
opens  in  Varadero,  owned  by  the 
Spanish company Sol Melia and Cuba's 
Cubanacan. 
1990-92:  Measures  are  introduced  to 
decentralise  the  state  trading  system, 
with  substantial  autonomy  granted  to 
new  corporations.  Large  numbers  of 
state bureaucrats are laid off. Plans are 
developed  for  reforming  the  currency 
and reducing state subsidies. 
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November 1990: For the first time at a 
trade  fair,  the  Cuban  Chamber  of 
Commerce  publicly  promotes  foreign 
investment in Cuba. 
October 1991: The Fourth Congress of 
the  Cuban  Communist  Party  proposes 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  (see 
below)  and  outlines  a  new  economic 
strategy after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. 
July  1992:  The  National  Assembly 
amends  the  Cuban  constitution  to 
protect  foreign  investment  in  Cuba; 
modify the concept of property and  the 
state's  economic  role;  end  the  state's 
monopoly  of  foreign  trade;  and 
recognise  private  enterprise  when 
carried out by companies and economic 
associations.  The  Council  of Ministers 
or its Executive Committee is given the 
right to  transfer  ownership  of a  given 
economic  entity  if  doing  so  would 
facilitate economic development. 
July  1992:  A  new  wholesale  pricing 
system is introduced with  the  intention 
of reflecting  the  real  cost  of external 
production inputs. February  1993:  Cuba's  first 
international  oil  licensing  round  is 
launched in Calgary and London. 
July  1993:  Fidel  Castro  announces 
legislation  of  hard-currency  use  by 
Cubans  and  its  free  circulation  in  the 
country  (Decree  Law 140);  the 
widening  of  openings  for  self-
employment in production and services; 
and the leasing of state land to  private 
producers,  to  be  worked  by 
cooperatives or families. 
August  1993:  In  the  biggest  cabinet 
shake-up  in  recent  Cuban  history,  the 
ministers  of  the  sugar  industry, 
agriculture,  finance  and 
communications are replaced. 
December 1993: The Council of State 
approves  the  sale  of  land  to  the 
Mexican company Cemex as part of an 
agreement  to  invest  in  the  Mariel 
cement works. 
March  1994:  The  Netherlands 
Caribbean  Bank  NV  - jf1int  venture 
between  lNG Bank of the Netherlands 
and Cuba's Acemex Group- is granted 
a licence to open a representative office 
in Havana, the first foreign involvement 
in  Cuban  since  nationalisation  in 
1960/61. 
April 1994:  Seven  new  ministries  are 
created and others abolished in a major 
reorganisation.  A  minister  for  tourism 
is appointed for the first time. 
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May  1994:  The  National  Assembly 
announces  a  radical  fiscal  package 
designed to balance the state budget by 
raising  prices  and  cutting  subsidies  to 
loss-making state enterprises. 
June  1994:  The  Canadian  minerals 
corporation Sherritt and the Cuban state 
enterprise General Nickel Co;  agree to 
establish  a jointly owned  enterprise  to 
mine,  refine  and  market  nickel.  The 
jointly  owned  assets  include  nickel-
refining  plants  in  Cuba  and  Canada, 
and  nickel  and  cobalt  concessions  in 
Cuba. 
July  1994: The  Association  of 
Caribbean States is formed,  with  Cuba 
as a founding member. 
August 1994: · The  National  Assembly 
announces the introduction of taxes  on 
property and  income for  the  first  time 
since 1967, to become effective in early 
1995. 
September 1994:  Defence  Minister 
Raul Castro  announces  that  free 
markets  in agricultural products will be 
permitted  beginning  October 1, 
encompassing  the  entire·  agricultural 
sector. 
October 1994: The  government  states 
that scarce manufactures and  consumer 
goods  may  henceforth be sold  directly 
to  the public  by  individuals  and  local 
state  industries,  with  traders,  not  the 
state,  setting  prices.  As  with  trade  in 
agricultural products, vendors will have 
to pay a  tax  on sales  and  the  markets 
will operate in Cuban pesos. Itt  addition  to  the  above  measures,  most  State-nm  farms  have  been  turned  into 
administratively  independent  cooperatives  called  unidades  bdsicas  de  produccion 
agricola  which  are  based  on  the  distribution  of land  ownership  rights  among  the 
cooperative  members,  who  are  entitled  to  sell  part  of their  produce  on  the  free 
agricultural market set up in October 1994. 
In a  speech  to  the Federacion  de  las  Mujeres  Cubanas  in February  this  year,  Fidel 
Castro  announced  that  the  market  economy  measures  already  introduced  were 
pennanent,  that other such  measures  would  follow  and that the  Cubi  ":  .:.  CX)p1e  must 
brace its-~lr fo,  ~l.  ''.:ave of redundancies (500 000 jobs are set to be axe,~ v· er '.he  next 
few  month~-) ·  ;  ,ich  would  be absorbed  by increased  foreign  investment  md  greater 
freedom for private enterprise. 
In another noteworthy development,  the ftrst conference with moderate Cuban exiles 
was held in Havana in Apri11994, and a second meeting is set for November this year. 
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THE IIELMS-BVRTON BILL 
Introduction 
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995  proposed by Senator Jesse 
Helms is currently before Congress, and could become law in July. 
The main provisions 
The proposed law purports to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy by stepping 
up the pressure on Cuba by: 
allowing  US  citizens  to  make  representations  to  a  special  committee  claiming 
expropriation of their property without compensation,  even  if those citizens  were 
of Cub~  nationality when their property was expropriated; 
allowing citizens making such representations to have any foreign national that has 
benefited,  however  indirectly,  from  the  expropriated  property,  indicted  for 
damages  and  interest  up  to  three  times  the  value  of the  property.  By  way  of 
example, a European hotel company could be ordered to pay damages and interest 
to  a  Cuban  farmer  and  naturalized  American  on  whose  expropriated  field  the 
Cuban government has built a hotel subsequently leased to the European company; 
refusing US  entry visas to  representatives of foreign companies (including spouses 
and  children)  that  have  "trafficked"  (i.e.  benefited  even  very  indirectly)  with 
expropriated goods; 
banning  US  banks  and  their  subsidiaries  from  making  loans  to  those  foreign 
nationals; 
reducing US  aid to Russia and the newly independent States in proportion to  their 
aid to Cuba (including the rent paid by Russia for its use of the Lourdes military 
base and radio surveillance station which,  according to the Clinton administration, 
is  needed  by  the  Russians  to  monitor  US  compliance  with  disarmament 
agreements); 
reducing US contributions to international financial institutions that lend to Cuba; 
banning US imports of sugar products from countries that import Cuban sugar. 
Some of these provisions overtly contravene established principles of international law 
and  the  rules  of  the  WTO,  and  are  designed  to  internationalize  the  embargo 
unilateral!  y. 
14 Initial international response 
Many countries, including Canada, Mexico and a number of EU Member States,  have 
officially  protested  to  the  US  authorities  about  the  Helms  bill.  To  cite  two  such 
reactions at EU level, on  15 March 1995 Sir Leon Brittan wrote to Warren Christopher 
expressing  the  Commission's  profound  objection  to  the  bill,  a  position  which  was 
endorsed by a Statement issued by the Presidency on behalf of the Union on 5 April. 
The  Clinton  administration  has  responded  very  vehemently  to  the  bill  in  a 
memorandum  that  stresses  that  its  provisions  are  illegal,  would  not  encourage  a 
peaceful transition in Cuba, and (with reference to the measures affecting Russia) could 
well harm the USA's broader security interests. 
15 Annex C 
International qreements between Cuba and EU Member States 
and politicallv and economically ins»ired yisits to Cuba .by representatives 
of the Member States and certain private bodies 
Below are listed, by way of an example, some of the most recent political and economic 
visits as well as the most important and/or recently concluded bilateral agreements: 
Germany: 
A delegation from  the Federal Ministry of Trade to  discuss an  agreement on  the 
protection and promotion of investment (1994). 
Klaus  Jiirgen  Hedrich,  State  Secretary  at the  Ministry  of Aid  and  Development 
(1994). 
Lothar Bisky, PDS President (1994). 
A high-level delegation from the Mercedes-Benz Group (1994). 
Denmark: 
Lasse  Budtz,  President  of the  Social  Democratic  Party's  international  relations 
committee (1995). 
Spain: 
Apolonio Ruiz Ligero, State Secretary for foreign trade (1994). 
Jose  Luis  Dicenta,  State  Secretary  for  international  and  Iberian-American 
cooperation (1994). 
Carmen Alborch, Minister of Culture (1994). 
France: 
Michel Charasse, Senator and presidential adviser (1994). 
Jean-Pierre  Desgeorges,  President  of the  CNPF  International,  heading  a  large 
business delegation (1995). 
Danielle Mitterand (1995). 
Finland: 
Petri Tuomi Nikula, Chancellory Director of Cultural Affairs (1994). 
Greece: 
Elizabeth Papazoi, Deputy Minister of the Environment (1994). 
16 Italy: 
Massimo Velloti, President of the Italian Confederation of Farmers (1994). 
Ludo Rattazzi, President of Air Europe (1994). 
Netherlands: 
Hans Fortuin, divisional head at the Ministry of Economic Affairs (1994). 
Klaas de Jong,  director of the trade and  industry  department of the Ministry  of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and the Environment (1994). 
Director of the Tourism and Transport Institute (1994). 
Willi van Wout, President Foreign Trade Centre Institute. 
Mr De Vilder, President of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, leading a 35-
strong business delegation (1994). 
United Kingdom: 
Adrian Beamish, Under Secretary at the Foreign Ministry (1994). 
Ian Taylor, Minster of Trade and Technology, leading a large business delegation 
(1994). 
David Jessop, Director of the Caribbean Trade Advisory Group (1994). 
David Suratgar, Vice President of the Board of Morgan Grenfel International, Vice 
President of the West India Committee and President of Caribbean  Council  for 
Europe (1994  ). 
Baroness Young, former Minister of Foreign Mfairs, leading a 40-strong business 
delegation. 
Sweden: 
Business delegation (1994). 
Pierre  Chorri,  Deputy  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  State  Secretary  for 
Cooperation (scheduled for June 1995). 
BUateral treaties 
Austria: 
Debt consolidation agreement (20 February 1987). 
Agreement on air services (11 February 1992). 
Denmark: 
Agreement on debt renegotiation (18 March 1987). 
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